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The Judicial Resolution of Legal
Disputes in the Integration Movements
of the Hemisphere
DAVID J. PADILLA*
1. INTRODUCTION

This article will give a brief overview of the origins of the different indigenous American integration movements and will explain the
respective methods of resolving legal disputes which arise from time
to time within the context of the different communities. Further, this
article will contrast the different methods of solving legal disputes in
American communities, with the primary vehicle for dispute resolution in the European Econoriic Community (EEC),1 namely, the
Court of Justice. Later, some observations will be set forth which
attempt to explain to some degree, the difference between the EEC
and the American communities in this respect. Finally, discussion
will be directed to models that have been suggested by several Latin
American commentators regarding the creation of new means of settling legal disputes in the economic integration area.
Without regard to the United States, the EEC is the best known
and, in many ways, the most advanced social, political, and economic
integration experiment of its kind. Still, the EEC is far from being
the only regional integration movement launched within the last
twenty-five years. At this time, a number of similar movements have
been initiated in the Western Hemisphere and many of these have
spawned intracontinental and intraregional submovements.
The adoption of integration measures has been inspired by the
economic success of the United States, and more specifically, by that
of the EEC. Recognizing the advantages to be derived from economic
and financial coordination, and appreciating the increasingly complex
and interdependent character of the modern world economy, each
movement has, in varying degrees, imitated the European and North
American integrational models. Accordingly, this has led to the creation of both intergovernmental, political, and regional technical institutions designed to set and establish policies, plans, priorities, and

* Deputy General Counsel and Director of the Office of General Legal Services,

OAS, Washington, D.C.; M.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of
Detroit Law School; L.L.M., George Washington University Law Center.
1. The EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 298 U.N.T.S.4.
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methods of implementation and enforcement. The largest of these, in
geographic terms, is the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), created in 1960.
A free trade association has as its purpose the elimination of in2
ternal trade barriers, tariff and non-tariff, among its member states.
Although this goal of internal free trade represents an important step
in the economic integration process, it fails to approach the creation
of a customs union, much less a true common market. A customs
union comprehends a free trade association, but goes a long step
further, by creating a common external tariff barrier. 3
Another indigenous integration movement set in motion in the
early 1960's is the Central American Common Market (CACM). Except for the interruption caused by hostilities between Honduras and
El Salvador in 1969, and for several years thereafter, this effort has
resulted in a dramatic increase in intramarket trade, although critics
have pointed out that the benefits have been to some extent skewed
in their distribution.
The last area in the New World to attempt economic integration
has been the Caribbean region. Numerous island states and several
small South American countries, in a common decision to reap the
potential benefits of integration, banded together to form the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).
Special problems, not uncommon to neighboring South and Central American countries, confronted the Caribbean community of
states. One such problem was the dependency of national economies
on the export of one or two cultural products or primary raw materials. Subject to market forces beyond their influence, the fortunes of
these states have historically ebbed and flowed in line with larger
world market forces, making for an uneven pattern of development.
Another peculiar characteristic of states in the Caribbean region
is their recent independence from European colonialism. After centuries of relations with Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands,
these mini-states have become very aware of the relative impotency
of small states, generally less developed, standing alone in a world of
finite resources.
Within CARIFTA, several of the larger and relatively more advanced states, with the hopes of speeding up the integration process,
2. F. RooT,
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formed a successor organization, the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), in 1973. At present, the CARICOM membership includes many of the smaller, less developed states.
Each movement derives its legitimacy from guiding multilateral
treaties which set objectives, establish the philosophy of the particular movement, create the institutions for the accomplishment of its
goals, and limit their respective parties' powers within the framework
of the movement.
These various constitutive charters represent momentous steps
forward in the field of international cooperation, insofar as they imply
voluntary yielding of traditional sovereign powers by parties.
Nevertheless, tension between nationalist interests and regional goals
naturally continues to play a crucial role in the life of these relatively
new movements.
As in the domestic life of a state, disputes of a legal nature occur
in the international relations of a government and the nation it represents. Interpretation of the different treaties and protocols, as well as
of the various directives, orders, and regulations made under their
auspices, make for chronic problems which must be addressed and
resolved if the larger objectives of the movements are to be attained.

II. LAFTA
The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) was
founded in February 1960, and has as its aim the creation of a Latin
American Common Market. Its members include all of the Spanishspeaking countries of South America, as well as Brazil and Mexico.
LAFTA was established by the Treaty of Montevideo, which calls for
a system of tariff reductions to help increase intra-association trade,
and to aid in the economic and social development of its member
countries. 4 Originally, the elimination of tariff and other trade barriers was to have been accomplished by 1973, but this target date has
been extended to 1980.
Given the special problems of certain relatively less developed
countries, namely Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, and to some extent,
Uruguay, more favorable terms were provided in the Treaty of Mon-

4. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American
Free Trade Association, signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, February 18, 1960,
I.R.I.E.A.L. 287, I.R.E.I.L.A. 207 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Montevideo].
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tevideo for these states. Although thousands of tariffs have been reduced or eliminated altogether, and intraregional trade has grown
greatly, the wide disparity of development among the members, notwithstanding the special treatment provided for some, has caused
serious problems in LAFTA's efforts to create a true free trade area.
The principal institutions of LAFTA and their functions are as
follows:
A. The Council of Foreign Ministers, the supreme organ
of LAFTA, meets regularly and makes all important policy decisions
related to regional integration.'
B. The Conference of Contracting Parties is made up of
the national delegations which meet annually to adopt decisions requiring joint resolution, to carry forward the process of integration, to
elect the officers of the Standing Executive Committee, and to set the
Association's annual budget. 6
C. The Standing Executive Committee consists of a representative of each member state and is the permanent organ of
LAFTA. Its functions include the duty to suggest initiatives, make
studies and reports on past accomplishments, and apply for technical
7
assistance grants.
D. The Secretariat provides the technical and administrative expertise for LAFTA, Linder the direction of an Executive Seeretary, who is elected by the members of the Conference. 8
E. The Special Commission of Jurists renders legal opinions on judicial problems referred to it by the Council or the Confer9
ence.
It should be noted that LAFTA, in accordance with the Treaty of
Montevideo, possesses a legal personality and, specifically, has the
power to contract, acquire, and dispose of property, institute legal
proceedings, and hold funds of any currency. 10

5. Creation of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Latin American
Free Trade Association, Res. 117 (V), 5th Regular Sess., Montevideo, Uruguay,
December 30, 1965; Protocol Institutionalizing the Council of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the Latin American Free Trade Association, signed at Montevideo,
Uruguay, December 12, 1966. I.R.I.E.A.L. 399, I.R.E.I.L.A. 318
6. Treaty of Montevideo, Arts. 34 and 35.
7. Id. Arts. 39 and 40.
8. Id. Art. 41.
9. Resolution 165 (CM-1/III-E).
10. Treaty of Montevideo, Art. 47.
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Dispute Settlement
With respect to the resolution of legal disputes, the Treaty of
Montevideo is silent. Nevertheless, from the outset, the contracting
parties were aware of this problem and in December 1964, the Conference, by Resolution 102, resolved to order the Executive Committee to study and prepare a proposcd protocol dedicated exclusively to
providing mechanisms for the resolutions of legal controversies.
In September 1967, the resultant Protocol for the Settlement of
Disputes was signed at Asunci6n, Paraguay. 1 The Protocol calls for
negotiations between parties in the event of a dispute, with the official cognizance of the Standing Executive Committee. Agreements arrived at by direct negotiations are, however, binding upon the parties.' 2 In the event such negotiations fail to result in a settlement of
the dispute, either party may submit the matter to the Arbitration
Court, which shall be composed of one arbitrator and one alternate
designated by each signatory to the treaty of Montevideo, both of
high professional and high moral standing. 1 3 Signatories of the Protocol shall be subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Arbitration
Court in all cases arising out of matters stemming from the application of the Treaty of Montevideo and its Protocols, as well as resolutions and decisions emanating from its agencies. As to other matters
4
of dispute, jurisdiction may be voluntarily accepted by the parties.'
When a dispute occurs, the parties are to name, by common
accord, three arbitrators from the total number nominated by the
governments. If these parties fail to agree on three arbitrators within
thirty days, the arbitrators shall bc designated on the basis of a rotation system, in the order of the names as they appear on the List of
Arbitrators. 1 5 Provision is also made in the Protocol for legal rep17
6
resentation, written and oral proceedings, the site of the hearings,
and disqualification of arbitrators.' 8 Decisions of the Arbitration
Court must be in writing, and majority holdings are final. Written
dissents must also be placed on the record. 19 Arbitral awards are
11. Protocol on the Settlement of Disputes, signed at Asuncion, Paraguay, September 2, 1967, I.R.I.E.L.A. 498.
12. Id. Ch. II, art. 4.
13. [d. Ch. III, arts. 9-15.
14. Id. Ch. IV, art. 16.
15. Id. Ch. IV, art. 18.
16. Id. Ch. IV, art. 20.
17. Id. Ch. IV, art. 21.

18. Id. Ch, IV, art. 19.
19. Id. Ch. IV, arts. 28 and 29.
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final and binding and have the force of res judicata.20 Failure to
execute an award by the losing party will justify economic reprisals in
the form of limited or suspended concessions for the national
21
schedules of the affected parties.
Generally speaking, the Protocol on the Settlement of Disputes
drawn at Asunci6n is very similar to the protocol to the Treaty of
Rome creating the EEC's Court of Justice. 22 There are, however, a
number of very important differences. First, the LAFTA Protocol
does not contemplate the standing of natural or juridical persons before the Arbitral Court. In addition, there is no provision in the
LAFTA Protocol similar to Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, which
allows interlocutory appeals from national courts to the Court of Justice on issues involving interpretation of EEC law.2 3 Finally, the
LAFTA Court does not sit permanently.
It should be noted that before the LAFTA Protocol was signed, a
provisional method of dispute settlement was provided for in Resolution 126 of the Conference of Capital Contracting Parties. This Resolution provided for the referral of controversies to the Special Commission of Jurists where negotiations, and subsequent conciliation efforts
by the Standing Executive Committee, had failed. 24 Unfortunately, this technique proved to be of limited utility since the Special
Commission could only take cognizance of a case where the Standing
Executive Committee unanimously decided to bring it to the Special
Commission's attention. Hence, a built-in veto by the parties themselves hampered whatever potential for usefulness the Special Commission of Jurists might have had in its arbitral role. 25 Moreover, it
was never clear that a holding of the Special Commission would have
had any effect.
Neither the LAFTA Protocol on the Settlement of Disputes, nor
the prior provisional method of referring cases from the Standing
Executive Committe to a Special Commission of Jurists has proven to
be an adequate institutionalization of the dispute settlement process.
The Protocol entered into force May 1971, with its fifth deposit of

20. Id. Ch. IV, art. 30.
21. Id. Ch. IV, art. 34.

22. Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice, DOCUMENTS FOR EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAw 36 (1976).
23. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, DOCUMENTS FOR
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 72 (1976).
24. Resolution 126 (CM-1/III-E).
25. Id.
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ratification. To date, only seven states-Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay-have ratified the Protocol. More importantly, the mechanism of the Arbitral Court, an ad
hoc body, has never been used, in spite of numerous important controversies arising out of the interpretation and application of LAFTA
law. 26
As a practical matter, actual cases have been resolved through
direct negotiations between the parties. While this type of conflict
settlement is unobjectionable from a certain point of view, it obviously does not provide for the orderly and progressive development
of Association jurisprudence. The net result, according to Professor
Francisco Orrego-Vicufia of the University of Chile, has been "a
substantial weakening of the rule of law in the process of (LAFTA)
integration." 27
III. THE ANDEAN PACT

In 1969, the South American countries lying along the Andean
cordillera decided, despite their LAFTA membership, to form a subregional integration movement aimed at the building of a customs
union. 28 The Andean Subregional Group, composed initially of
Chile, Bolivia, Perti, Ecuador, and Colombia, came into existence
with the final ratification of the Cartagena Agreement, which created
the nascent common market known as the Andean Pact, a market
where the free flow of goods, capital, and labor would be permitted
throughout the subregion. 29 Since its inception, Venezuela has
adhered to the Agreement, while Chile has denounced it and with30
drawn from the Pact.
The boldest step taken by the Andean Group has been the establishment of a common external tariff and the promulgation of a common investment code designed to provide the less developed
member states with some leverage vis-a-vis the large transnational
companies, which historically have played an important role in their
respective economies. The Cartagena Agreement also provides for

26. Id.
27. Orrego-Vicufia, Economic Integration in Latin America: A Comparative Inter-

lude,

EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

IN PERSPECTIVE

470 (1976).

28. Cartagena Agreement, May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Cartagena Agreement]. For a Spanish text see COMPILACI6N DE DOCUNIENTOS
RELACIONADOS CON EL ACUERDO DE CARTAGENA 67 (1975).
29. ROOT, supra note 2, at 378.
30. Vargas-Hidalgo, An Evaluation of the Andean Pact, 10 LAw. Am. 401 (1978).
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special treatment of Bolivia and Ecuador, the Group's least developed
states.31
The principal institutions created to guide the Group's collective
efforts and their functions are outlined below:
A. The Commission, composed of one representative of each
government, is the supreme organ of the Group. It is responsible for
setting Group policy, approving procedures for the coordination of
national plans, and harmonizing national economic policies. In addition, the Commission appoints the members of the Board and inand
structs them, and sees to it that the provisions of the Agreement
32
the LAFTA Treaty of Montevideo are faithfully carried out.
B. The Board is the technical organ of the Group and is
composed of three members appointed by the Comnission for
three-year terms. Its mandate is to examine questions of common interest and make proposals to the Commission, taking into account the
benefits to be gained from a regional point of view. In formulating
proposals, tile Board may recommend regulations for the Commission's consideration. This power of initiative, comparable to that of
the EEC's Commission, is an important aspect of the Board's responsibilities. The Board's tasks also include an annual evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Group's efforts in light of the Agreement's objectives.3 3 Finally, the Board acts as a secretariat for the Commission
by hiring technical experts capable of the sophisticated assignments
which it must carry out.
C. The Advisory Committee acts as a clearing house for
Board proposals before they are sent to the Commission. The Committee, composed of delegations of member states, meets with the
cooperation
Board at the latter's request and generally assures 3 close
4
between the Board and the member governments.
D. The Social and Economic Advisory Committee is made
up of representatives from the industrial and labor sectors of member
states. Input by this Committee seeks to incorporate the point of view
of the different economic groups within the respective nations, as the
Andean Group strives to arrive at policies satisfactory to all members
and their citizens.3 5

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Cartagena Agreement, Ch. XIII, art. 91.
Id. Ch. II, § A, arts. 6 and 7.
Id. Ch. II, § B, arts. 13-18.
Id. Ch. II, § C, arts. 19-21.
Id. Ch. II, § C, art. 22.

LEGAL DISPUTES IN INTEGRATION MOVEMENTS

A tentative progress report on the success of the Andean Pact
shows that intraregional trade has increased dramatically and continues to rise. Moreover, despite the setbacks suffered by the withdrawal of Chile, tariff barriers continue to be reduced and conformance to schedules and Pact law regarding the implementation of a
36
common external tariff has been forthcoming.
Dispute Settlement
When a dispute arises between member states, certain steps are
to be taken towards the resolution of differences. The first step is
direct negotiation between the parties to the dispute. Where direct
negotiation fails, the Commission may intervene by exercising its
good offices and taking other informal measures. If these measures
then the Commission must
fail to resolve the parties' differences,
37
make formal efforts at conciliation.
The procedure devised for conciliating legal disputes consists of
the appointment of an ad hoc committee by the Commission composed of a national representing each disputant and a national from
each of the remaining member countries. The Committee is charged
with conducting its own investigation, hearing the parties, and, by
majority vote, adopting a report containing recommendations for the
resolution of the problem. The report is then referred to the Commission for its final decision. Notwithstanding these procedures, this
method of dispute settlement has proven totally inadequate since the
decision of the Commission is not binding.
Where these efforts do not resolve the dispute, the Agreement
provides that the member countries shall be subject to the LAFTA
Protocol on the Settlement of Disputes. While the Agreement provides that iiiembers of the Andean Group shall undertake steps to
ratify the Protocol as soon as possible, only Bolivia, Colombia, and
Ecuador have ratified it to date. Thus, as in the case of LAFTA, there
is no formal method of litigating disputes and obtaining authoritative
judgments regarding the application of Andean Pact law.
In reality, reliance has been placed on informal methods, although the Pact's Commission is more actively involved than the
Standing Executive Committee of LAFTA. Still, the need for a central court for the Andean Group is even greater than that of LAFTA,
since its aims and its constitutive treaty are more ambitious and more
36. Orrego-Vicufia, supra note 27, at 475.
37. Cartagena Agreement, Ch. II, § D, art, 23.

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

complex than those of LAFTA. The classical separation of powers
found in most democratic institutions is absent here, as there is no
central court and the Commission, which is the legislative and most
political branch, also acts as the peacemaker and unofficial adjudicator.
In the words of Professor Orrego-Vicufia:
The experience derived from the few years the Agreement has
been functioning has shown that these mechanisms for the solution
of controversies are impractical insofar as they fail to respond to
the true legal needs of the integration process. In the first place,
they do not provide for a permanent legal function, in circumstances where the volume and importance of subregional law
fully warrant it. In the second place, they fail to insure a uniform
interpretation of the legal regime, a need palpably demonstrated
by the problems which arose in connection with the adoption of
Decision 24, regarding treatment of foreign capital, particularly in
the case of Chile, and above all, Colombia, problems which probably could have been avoided had there been a formal opinion by a
subregional judicial organ. 38
An even more glaring inadequacy of the current system is the
total lack of recourse on the part of private citizens and businesses
which are often directly -affected by measures adopted by the Commission.
Recently, the establishment of an Andean Tribunal, remedying
many of these inadequacies, seems virtually certain. 39 This body is
more thoroughly discussed below.
IV.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET

The General Treaty of the Central American Common Market
(CACM), which came into force in 1961, was formulated under the
40
aegis of the Organization of Central American States (ODECA).
The CACM has five member countries: Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. The General Treaty provides
38. Orrego-Vicufia, La Creaci6n de un Tribunal de Justicia en el Grupo Andino,
8 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION 37 (1974). This and subsequent translations are the
author's own.
39. INTEGRACION LATINOAMEBJCANA, October 1978, at 39, 42 (1978).
40. Charter of the Organization of Central American States, signed at Panama
City, Panama, December 12, 1962, HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS . ..

PERTAINING TO-INTER-AMERICAN-AFFAIRS,

93rd Cong., ist Sess., 303, 303-307 (1973).
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for the elimination of all internal trade barriers, and, to date, almost
all such barriers have been removed. Moreover, a uniform external
tariff on approximately eighty-seven percent of the items on the regional customs classification list has been set. Intraregional trade expanded greatly during the CACM's first decade-from $34 million in
1960 to $274 million in 1971.41
The states within CACM have faced some difficult problems,
both naturally and artificially created. In 1971, Honduras and El Salvador cut diplomatic relationships with each other due to hostilities
erupting because of the so-called Soccer War. 42 Although the "War"
lasted only five days, relations between the two countries are only
now being normalized. Nicaragua suffered a calamitous earthquake in
1972, 4 3 while much of Guatemala was flattened by another earthquake three years later. 44 At the present time, Nicaragua is in the midst
of civil war. 4 5 Notwithstanding these events which obviously have
taken their toll on the CACM's momentum, this regional integration
effort still continues to progress, although not as rapidly as its founders had hoped.
The principal institutions created under the General Treaty, and
their functions, are outlined below:
A. The Economic Council, composed of the Ministers of
Economy of the member-countries, meets periodically in one of the
five member-countries' capital cities to set economic guidelines for the
46
Common Market.
B. The Executive Council is charged with implementing
measures to carry out the General Treaty. It is composed of one delegate from each member state. The Council decides on a case-by4 7
case basis whether a given resolution will be approved.

41. Orrego-Vicufia, supra note 27, at 468.
42. The 1969 conflict is known as the "Soccer War" because it was set off by a
riot following a heated soccer match between teams from Honduras and El Salvador.
See LATIN AM. INDEX, November 16-30, 1977, at 88.
43. City Dies in a Circle of Fire: Managua Earthquake, TIME, January 8, 1973, at
24.
44. Wilde, Guatemala: Earthquake and Affterinath, CHRUSTIAN CENTURY, March
31, 1976, at 310.
45. 46 LATIN Am. ECON. REPORT, October 20, 1978 at 323.
46. General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, signed at Managua, Nicaragua, December 13, 1960, I.R.I.E.A.L. 24, I.R.E.I.L.A. 23 [hereinafter
cited as General Treaty].
47. Id. Ch. 9, arts. XXI and XXII.
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C. The Permanent Secretariat serves both Councils and
provides the technical staff necessary to carry out research studies
48
and economic evaluations.
D. The Central American Bank for Economic Integration
economic growth. Loans are
helps finance and promote integrated,
49
made only to member states.
Dispute Settlement
Article XXVI of the General Treaty provides that signatory states
shall seek to settle all disputes in an amicable fashion, invoking the
assistance of the Executive Council or Economic Council, as the case
may warrant. If, however, agreement cannot be reached in this manner, the Article prescribes arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal is to be
chosen from a list of three arbitrators selected from each member
state's highest courts. Thereafter, the Secretary General of the organization of Central American States (ODECA) draws one name by
lot from each of the member states' candidates. Decisions of the Tri50
bunal are resjudicata and must be made by at least a majority vote.
As early as 1907, efforts have been made to establish a Central
American Supreme Court. Under the Charter of ODECA, such a
Court was eventually brought into existence. It should be noted that
several of ODECA's organs also serve as organs of the CACM. In
theory, the Court of Justice could serve as a forum for the purpose of
litigating disputes arising under the CACM General Treaty. Article
14 of the Charter of ODECA provides that the Central American
Court of Justice shall be made up of the Presidents of the Judiciaries
of each of the member states. Article 15(a), which defines the competence of the Court, has proven to be the weak spot for the effective
use of the Court. That Article states, inter alia:
The functions of the Central American Court of Justice are: (a) to
decide the conflicts of a legal nature which arise among the
Member States and which later agree to submit to it. (Emphasis
added.)
As a practical matter, this defeasance condition has rendered the
Court of Justice sterile. The two primary mechanisms for the resolu48. Id. Ch. 9, arts. XXIII and XXIV.
49. Agreement Establishing the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, signed at Managua, Nicaragua, December 13, 1960, I.R.I.E.A.L. 143, 149. See
also General Treaty, Ch. 7, art. XVIII.
50. General Treaty, Ch. 10, art. XXVI.
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tion of legal disputes connected with the movement toward Central
American integration and arbitration, under Article XXVI of the
General Treaty, and the Court of Justice, under the ODECA Charter
are total failures; not a single case has ever been adjudicated by
either body.
The vacuum left in their place is actually being filled by the
decision-making of the Executive Council. For instance, in 1965,
upon complaints presented by Costa Rica and El Salvador against
Guatemala's Decree Law No. 355, which imposed unlawful import
duties on products made in the complaining states, the Executive
Council resolved that the Guatemalan law was illegal and the Secretary General was charged with taking steps to persuade the sister
Republic of Guatemala to annul its Decree Law inasmuch as it was
prejudicial to achieving free trade in Central America. 5 1 Guatemala
52
abided by the decision.
In another case, El Salvador complained that Guatemala's sanitation laws regarding the importation of salt were unreasonable. In that
instance, the Executive Council, by Resolution No. 57, held that any
attempt by one member state to obstruct free trade from another was
illegal, and that sanitation standards acceptable in a given state were
ipso facto sufficient to satisfy similar standards of any other member
state. Once again, Guatemala complied with the resolution of the
53
Executive Council.
While these cases were not decided by a duly constituted court
of law, they do show that there is a tendency on the part of CACM's
organs to penetrate the exclusive sovereignty of its member states in
the area of lawmaking. Although there has been a predisposition on
the part of the respective governments to respond favorably to the
community's organs, the dispute-solving process is still overly reliant
on bilateral negotiations and political compromise. At the same time,
the standing of the natural or corporate person is ignored. A body of
community law as such has not emerged and to that extent there is
less certainty than might be hoped for on the part of the business
sector. National judiciaries, too, are at a loss for guidance from a centralized, authoritative interpretation of community law.

51.

INSTITUTO

INTERAMERICANO

DERECHO COMUNITARIO

(1968).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 367.

DE ESTUDIOS

JURIDICOS INTERNACIONALES,

CENTROAMERICANO-ENSAYO

DE SISTEMATIZACION

365
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V.

CARIFTA-CARICOM

The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was the precursor of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Founded in 1968,
it was originally composed of eleven members, all Caribbean island
states except for Guyana. Belize subsequently adhered to the Charter
in 1970. CARIFTA's principal goal was the gradual elimination of internal tariff and non-tariff barriers. The Caribbean Development Bank
was established to provide funds and technical assistance to member
states (and a number of nonmember associated states) in their respec54
tive development programs.
On July 14, 1973, the four most advanced members of
and Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, and
CARIFTA -Trinidad
Jamaica-established CARICOM as a successor to CARIFTA. 55
Eight additional emembers have since joined CARICOM. 5 6
CARICOM came into existence under the aegis of the CARIFTA
convention in the same fashion that the Andean Group was formed
out of LAFTA. The constitutive agreements which brought
CARICOM into existence are the Treaty establishing the Caribbean
Community, and the Annex to that Treaty, which actually created the
terms of reference for the Caribbean Common Market.5 7
Although the primary objective of CARICOM may be seen as
full economic integration, that is by no means its only goal.
CARICOM is also involved in coordinating such services as health,
education, industrial relations, and communications, as well as formulating a common foreign policy. 58
Given its relatively recent origin, it is a bit premature to try to
characterize the success of this movement. Three of its member states
(the exception being Jamaica) have proven oil reserves, with the
promise of the discovery of additional oil, and all of its members have
considerable hard mineral wealth. Despite this great promise,
political-ideological differences between Jamaica and Guyana on the

54. Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association, signed at Antigua, April 30, 1968, 7 I. L. M. 935 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Georgetown Accord].
55. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community (Georgetown Accord), signed
at Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, July 4, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1033 (1973).
56. Those other members are: Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Monserrat,
St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent.
57. Annex, The Caribbean Common Market, UNCTAD/B/609/Add. 1 (Vol. 1),
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could hamper harone hand, and Belize and Trinidad on the other,
59
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The main institutional organs of CARICOM and their functions
are:

A. The Conference of Heads of Government sets policy objectives, issues directives to the Council, and represents the Community
for treaty-making purposes. 60 CARICOM enjoys legal personality
within the terms of its constitutive agreements. 6 1
B. The Common Market Council, composed of a representative
of each member state, is the principal organ of the Common Market,
as distinct from CARICOM. Its chief responsibility is to see to the
implementation of the Treaty and Annex, as well as to expedite the
creation of a true Common Market. As with its European and Andean
counterparts, the Common Market Council of CARICOM has an initiating and research function, though subject to the ultimate
decision-making authority of the Conference of Heads of Govern62
ment.
Dispute Settlement
In the field of dispute settlement, the Common Market Council,
in a manner similar to its Latin American equivalents, plays an important role. Article 7 of the Annex states that, among other things,
the Council is responsible for the following:
(b) Insuring the efficient operation and development of the
Common Market including the settlement of problems arising
out of its functioning;
(d) receiving and considering references alleging breaches of any
obligations arising under this Annex and deciding thereon.
Article 11 of the Annex, entitled "Disputes Procedure within the
Common Market," holds that if any member state believes that it is
being deprived of any benefit to which it is entitled or any objective
of the Common Market is being frustrated by a delinquent state and
no solution has been found between the parties, it may present the
matter to the Common Market Council. The Council is bound to investigate the matter, and may, on the motion of one of the disputants
or sua sponte, refer the matter to an Arbitral Tribunal.
59. Georgetown Accord, Arts. 6-8.
60. Id. Art. 20.
61. Annex, Arts. 5-7.

62. Id. Art. 11.
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Additionally, the Council may make recommendations to the
disputants and, should compliance not be forthcoming, may authorize
sanctions in the form of reciprocal suspension of privileges against the
offending party. A party disputant may also request an interim remedy pending a decision by the Council or the Tribunal. Such prejudgment remedies could take the form of an injunction where something akin to irreparable harm can be shown. 63
Article 12 of the Annex sets forth the rules of arbitration. Each
member state nominates two qualified candidates from a list of arbitrators maintained by the Secretary General. In case of a dispute,
each party designates an arbitrator from the Secretary General's list
who, in turn, can select a third arbitrator from the same source.
Where the first two arbitrators cannot agree, the Secretary General
may fill the third vacancy.
The tribunal sessions are ad hoc and the arbitrators may establish
their own procedure, hearing the parties' views by oral or written
argument or both. Failure to comply with an arbitral award gives rise
to the suspension of certain benefits enjoyed under the Treaty and
64
the Annex.
To date, arbitration has not been used in dispute settlement. As
with the other integration movements in the hemisphere, the
CARICOM governments have shown a decided preference for bilateral settlement of problems, at times invoking the mediating assistance of the Common Market Council.
The same general conclusions noted earlier regarding the deficiencies of these dispute settlement provisions might be repeated
here. Natural and legal persons have no standing, and political compromise prevails in place of true juridical rigor.
These integration movements, while notably successful in many
areas, have shown remarkable resistance to establishing a centralized
court system comparable to the EEC Court of Justice. Such a centralized court system would be capable of deciding legal controversies
in a more consistent and universal manner, and under the framework
of procedures currently in the books but scarcely in use.

63. Id. Art. 12.
64. Orrego-Vicufia, supra note 27, at 31.
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VI. SOME TENTATIVE OBSERVATIONS AND
PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

The instruments which establish the superstructures for the different integration movements are, by and large, the products of
economists. This group of specialists tends to concentrate on the
economic and financial aspects of its creations; this emphasis, however, has proven to be somewhat utopian. In considering the establishment of central market courts, economic drafters and planners
feared that the practical and tangible problems of reducing and
eliminating trade barriers and of stimulating the free movement of
goods, capital, and labor, might have given rise to a plethora of legal
holdings. Given the fear of the national-law bias of lawyers in their
respective countries, it seems likely that a certain amount of antilawyer and anti-legalism sentiment played a role in the conscious decisions of the economic draftsmen to de-emphasize the roles of
lawyers and courts in the integration process. 65 Barbados Ambassador MeComie succinctly expressed this sentiment when he stated:
"the question is whether we should have [dispute settlement]
mechanisms at all, that is to say, whether the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms will induce more disputes." 6 6
A similar attitude is expressed in the belief that integration
movements are and must be dynamic and fluid, and that therefore,
traditionally conservative legal institutions do not provide the best
answers to legal disputes. 6 6 Other commentators on the subject
share the view expressed by Guatemalan Professor A. Molina Orantes
when he said: "the important thing is to come up with preventive
68
measures . . . . One should stress conciliation as a process."
A sentiment common to all countries is their jealous attitude in
matters that might threaten their traditional sovereign prerogatives.
In the case of the Latin American countries, the memory of the Monroe Doctrine "Gunboat Diplomacy," and frequent foreign interventions in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
has formed nationalistic suspicions against outside agencies, whatever
their origins. These attitudes have given rise to legal principles such
65. Colloquium on Certain Legal Aspects of Inter-American Cooperation, 5 GA.
J. IT'L & Comp. L. 158 (1975).
66. Jimenez, Sobre la Justicia en la Integraci6n Regional, REVISTA DE CIENCIAS
JURIOICAS,
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DE COSTA RICA 285 (1972).

67. Colloquium on Certain Aspects of Inter-American Cooperation, supra note
65, at 160.
68. Id. at 147.
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as the Calvo Doctrine, which holds that a foreign entity doing business in a Latin American state shall be subject to local laws and shall
only have recourse to that state's courts for redress of its grievances. 6 9 This principle is a reaction against years of intervention
which has taken many forms (some less than praiseworthy), on the
part of the United States and certain European powers.
For the Caribbean states, the realities of colonialism are still
fresh in the memories of most citizens, and the governments and nationals alike are understandably sensitive in matters that may touch
upon their independence.
Another explanation which cannot be overlooked is the traditional emphasis in Latin American diplomacy, in general, and Latin
American domestic relations, in particular, on the political approach
to problem-solving. In part, this stems from the fact that, with few
exceptions, the executive branches of government have tended to
overshadow the other branches, particularly, the judiciary. While
most Latin American constitutions provide for the separation of powers and a system of checks and balances, in practice, these devices
are not operative. The executive branches of the various governments
show a marked preference for resolving disputes bilaterally or by invoking the assistance of representatives of other executive branches.
The suspicion that law and lawyers take too long, cost too much, and
in the end, threaten the independence of the different governments,
is a palpable bias that must be overcome if the process of resolving
disputes on more than an rd hoc political basis is to become institutionalized.
There is a strong preference on the part of the Latin American to
avoid the frank hostilities inherent in the courtroom battle. This point
.of view cannot be measured in a concrete empirical manner; notwithstanding, it seems to this writer to be an element which should
not be ignored. Moreover, in the early days of the different integration movements, there was a spirit of optimism and fraternity which
might have been threatened by crude litigation in contrast to the
more gentlemanly art of negotiation and compromise. Finally, with
the exception of the ill-fated 1907 Court of Justice of Central
America, the individual has never been a proper subject of international law in Latin American legal practice. This will change soon,
however, when an Inter-American Human Rights Court comes into
existence.
69. Guier, La Justicia en el Mercado Cointin Centroamericano, 6 REVISTA DE
UNIVERSIDAD DE COSTA RICA 7 (1965).
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At a time of increased concern about the protection of individual
rights, the conservative inclinations of many states and its jurists are
obviously impeding reluctant governments from submitting to the
jurisdiction of supranational institutions. 70 In spite of this state of
affairs and this panoply of political, cultural, and legal attitudes, there
is a formidable body of thought in the various states of the hemisphere which is actively promoting the establishmnt of an international "community" court of law designed to deal with legal disputes,
provide uniformity, and give some measure of protection and guidance to citizens and governments alike, as the various integration
experiments mature and move forward.
A case in point is the current move to establish an Andean Tribunal. 71 In 1971, the Commission of the Andean Group, at its Sixth
Special Session, directed the Board to carry out the necessary preliminary study for such a tribunal; the matter was to be taken up
again in 1972.72 The Board, responding to the Commission's directives, requested reports from international specialists as well as national authorities on the subject. In June 1972, a meeting of experts
was held, which included the participation of Professor Gerard
Olivier, Deputy General Director of the Legal Service of the European Community, and Doctor Pierre Pescapore, a judge on the
73
European Court.
On the basis of the meeting's findings and the various studies,
the Board prepared a Draft Treaty designed to create an Andean
Community Court. In its general configuration, the court would
closely resemble its European counterpart, except that its membership would consist of only three eligible nationals from any Latin
American state. Similarities with the European Court of Justice include the privileged status accorded judges, the high moral and intellectual attainment required of candidates, and the prohibition against
outside employment, except in the case of academic pursuits. 74 The
Court, as contemplated in the Draft Treaty, would be permanent and
its jurisdiction would relate exclusively to matters arising out of the
Andean Community. In drafting the proposed Treaty, the Board ex-

70.
71.

INTEGRACI6N LATINOAMERICANA, supra note 39.
R.F.V. GARCiA-AMADOR, EL ORDENAMIENTO JURIDICO ANDINO 101 (1977).

72. Id. at 101-102.
73. Id. at 102-103.
74. Orrego-Vieufia, supra note 27, at 39.
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pressly recognized that the LAFTA Protocol for the Settlement of
75
Disputes was inadequate for the purposes of the Andean Group.
In terms of power, the proposed court could nullify the acts of
the other two principal community organs. The bases for such nullification would exist: 1) where an organ violated the terms of the Treaty
of Cartagena, or 2) where an organ abused its power by an ultra vires
act. 76

An important aspect of the Treaty is the right of the individual to
apply to the court. Thus, natural or juridical persons could challenge
the legality of an act or decision of the Commission or the Board, and
similarly, one community organ could sue another. 7 7 States, too,
would have the right to sue and could be sued. All of these jurisdictional characteristics of the proposed Andean Court closely resemble
those of the European Court of Justice. Another remedy available to
all potential parties-litigants would be an action akin to mandamus,
whereby a party might compel another to carry out an obligation established by community law. 78 Finally, Draft Treaty Article 24 provides for a system of pre-judicial determinations similar to those per79
mitted under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome.
The treaty will probably be signed during the course of 1979. It
is unlikely that the creation of an Andean Tribunal will cause deeply
seated prejudices to shift in favor of a general trend to set up multinational courts. Still, it is a first step of much importance, and the
example it sets will certainly be noticed by the rest of the Latin
American community.
The second area where serious efforts have been made to create
a community court is in Central America. At the Second Central
American Juridical Congress celebrated at San Jose in 1964, several
national delegations recommended the creation of a permanent court.
The Costa Rican delegation, citing the example of the EEC Court of
Justice, called for the creation of a similar institution."0 The
Guatemalan delegation went even further in proposing a Central
American Court of Justice which would enjoy mandatory jurisdiction

75. Id. at 40.
76. Id. at 41.
77. Cardenas, Metodos de Solucion de Controversias Coinerciales Internacionales, 8 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION 103 (1975).
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over any type of international dispute in the area, including all cases
involving alleged violations of human rights, as well as legal disputes
arising out of the integration process. 8 1 Despite the different proposals put forth favoring the establishment of such a court, no action
on the part of the institutions of the CACM has taken place.
The most practical proposal yet put forth was made by Licenciado Rolando Soto Jimenez, Professor of Economic Law at the University of Costa Rica. Professor Soto proposes that a "Superior
Court," composed of one judge from each Central American state, be
appointed by the Executive Council. The Court would be competent
to hear cases involving the application and interpretation of the General Treaty. As in the case of the European Court, before a party
could appeal from a national court to the Superior Court, he would
be obliged to exhaust the national procedure provided for in his country of origin. 82 Notwithstanding this provision, however, an interlocutory appeal like that provided for in Article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome would be permitted. 83 As may be seen in the few provisions
mentioned here, Professor Soto's proposal is very similar to the Andean Draft Treaty and takes its inspiration from its model in Europe.
The great achievements of the European Community, especially
in the area of resolving legal disputes, have not gone unobserved in
South and Central America. However, with the limited exception of
the proposed Andean Tribunal, these ideas have thus far failed to
overcome strong national resistance. There is an enlightened body of
thought which continues to press for the realization of true community courts of justice.

81. Jimenez, supra note 66, at 294.
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